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In common law jurisdictions, the principal remedy against a defaulting fiduciary is to 
strip his wrongful gains.  This can be achieved through a wide gamut of remedies that 
may be both personal and proprietary.  In relation to the personal action for account of 
profits, the established orthodoxy requires a fiduciary to disgorge all the unauthorised 
profits he made from his fiduciary position, subject to equitable allowance awarded 
by the court: Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378; Murad v Al-Saraj 
[2005] WTLR 1573.  This strict position, however, has not been universally accepted 
in common law jurisdictions.  Some courts have sought to lay down remedial 
principles to limit the extent of disgorgement, such as by requiring a closer connection 
between the breach and the gain: see, for example, Warman International v Dwyer 
(1995) 182 CLR 544; Kao Lee & Yip v Koo [2003] 3 HKLRD 296.  
 
In relation to the more controversial question of the availability of proprietary relief 
for breach of fiduciary duty, common law jurisdictions are even more divided.  On the 
one hand, English court has refused to follow Attorney General of Hong Kong v Reid 
[1994] 1 AC 324, which was adopted in Singapore in Sumitomo Bank Ltd v Kartika 
Ratna Thahir (Pertamina) [1992] SGHC 301, and attempted to lay down bright-line 
criteria for awarding proprietary relief.  In Sinclair Investments v Versailles [2012] Ch 
453, Lord Neuberger MR held that the receipt of unauthorised profits by a fiduciary 
will not give rise to a trust unless it involves a misuse of the principal’s assets or 
opportunities (at [88]). The first exception in Sinclair refers to actual misappropriation 
of the principal’s assets, while the second, broader, exception deals with 
misappropriation of opportunities in breach of fiduciary duty.  The latter is more 
difficult to justify because the principal does not have pre-existing ownership in the 
asset in respect of which the claim is brought, and has been the subject of a proposed 
overhaul (see FHR European Ventures LLP v Mankarious [2013] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 416, 
per Etherton C at [116]). On the other hand, courts in Canada and Australia have long 
embraced a discretionary constructive trust: LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona 
Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 at 44-45; Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL 
(No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6 at [583]. 
 
The present paper seeks to explore the relative advantages and disadvantages of these 
diverging approaches.  Of the many ways in which a defaulting fiduciary can garner 
profits, the paper will focus on two, namely the taking of bribes and interception of 
business opportunity.  This is because they present the greatest challenge to the choice 
between restricting the principal to a personal remedy and allowing him proprietary 
relief with the attendant proprietary consequences. 
 
In particular, the paper will: first, examine the theoretical bases of the profit-stripping 
regime (including strict deterrence, implied undertaking, deemed agency, etc) with a 
view to delineating the appropriate boundaries of personal and proprietary remedies; 
secondly, argue for the development of flexible but also principled remedial rules to 
calibrate the disgorgement remedy; and thirdly, contend that while the spontaneous 
imposition of the institutional constructive trust to profits obtained from bribes and 
business opportunities is not warranted, this does not necessarily shut the door to a 
more discretionary form of constructive trust.  In fact, the remedial constructive trust 
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has more to offer than first meets the eye, for there is sufficient jurisprudence in 
existing case law to generate the criteria for fashioning proprietary relief according to 
the needs of individual cases (cf RP Austin, ‘The Melting Down of the Remedial 
Constructive Trust’ (1988) 11 UNSW Law Journal 66). 
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